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BOOK REVIEW: Metaphysics by Default, by Wayne Stewart, 1999, http://mbdefault.org/. 
 
This online philosophical monograph is divided into 20 chapters, 8 appendices and a list of 
Works Cited. For an abstract of the entire work, see Wayne Stewart, “Metaphysics by Default: 
Naturalism and Metaphysics Reconciled,” Metaphysics by Default, 
http://mbdefault.org/lectures/abstract2.asp. 
This review will focus on Chapters 9 and 11 (accessed July 6, 2018). The review is divided 
into four sections: (1) summary of the Chapters’ conclusions, (2) assessment of the Chapters’ 
arguments, (3) further comments on the Chapters, including suggestions for future research, and 
(4) concluding remarks. 
 
1. Summary of the Conclusions 
 
In Chapter 9, Stewart defends the thesis that if non-reductive physicalism is true,2 then, contrary 
to a widespread belief, death does not bring about eternal oblivion, a permanent cessation of the 
stream of consciousness at the moment of death. Stewart argues that the stream of consciousness 
continues after death—devoid of the body’s former memories and personality traits—and it does 
so as the stream of consciousness of new, freshly conscious bodies (other humans, animals, etc., 
that are conceived and develop consciousness). And so, any permanent cessation of the stream of 
consciousness at the moment of death is impossible as long as new, freshly conscious bodies 
come to exist. Consciousness is defined here as awareness, and is not limited to self-awareness 
(i.e., the recognition of one’s awareness). This general thesis does not specify when in the future 
those new, freshly conscious bodies must have come into being. This thesis has been 
independently defended by several authors.3 
In Chapter 9, Stewart argues more specifically for what he calls the existential passage 
hypothesis, expressing the concept in several ways, e.g.:  
 
1 Email: jeandavidrobert@hotmail.com 
2, Wayne Stewart, “Lectures,” Metaphysics by Default, http://mbdefault.org/lectures/transcript.asp (Accessed July 6, 
2018). See also Thomas Sturm, “Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive 
physicalism,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 14, no. 1 (2012): 55–63. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3341650/. 
3 Thomas W. Clark, “Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity,” The Humanist 54, no. 6 (November 1994): 15–21. 
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Where nature assembles necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon, we trust nature to 
deliver the phenomenon. That trust applies to essay conditions, as everywhere.4 [pers. comm.] It 
applies for example to William James’ unfelt time-gap; delivering the unfelt time-gap wherever 
nature assembles conditions for it, even if conditions are assembled across separate persons.5 
The following is my own restatement of that hypothesis: 
For any conscious body, x, x’s stream of consciousness continues, following x’s 
permanent cessation of consciousness (or death), as the stream of consciousness of some 
other body (or passage recipient), y, namely the first body to have gained (or first 
experienced) consciousness following x’s death.6 
Importantly, by “x’s stream of consciousness continues…,” what I mean (from this point 
onward) is that x’s stream of consciousness continues unimbued with x’s former memories and 
personality traits. 
Given my restatement of the existential passage hypothesis, the notion of existential 
passage (as used by Stewart) can be stated as follows: 
For any conscious body, x, the passage that occurs when x’s stream of consciousness 
continues, following x’s death, as the stream of consciousness of some other body (or 
passage recipient), y, namely the first body to have gained consciousness following x’s 
death. 
In an appended chapter, Stewart argues that existential passage is unaffected by spatial distances 
and differences in central nervous systems (CNSs) and that this passage can thus theoretically 
occur between vastly distant worlds harboring living organisms with vastly different CNSs.7 
In Chapter 11, Stewart explains and illustrates how four types of existential passage 
logically follow from the existential passage hypothesis. These four types are restated as 
follows:8 
• A unitary passage: For a given conscious body, x1, x1’s stream of consciousness 
continues, following x1’s death, as the stream of consciousness of some other body, y, 
namely the first body to have gained consciousness following x1’s death; and neither a 
merged passage nor a split passage has occurred. 
 
notable-theoretical-convergence (Accessed July 6, 2018); David J. Darling, Zen Physics, the Science of Death, the 
Logic of Reincarnation (Harpercollins, 1996); Mark F. Sharlow, “Why Science Cannot Disprove the Afterlife,” 
Patchworks, 2009, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.638.1519&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(Accessed February 27, 2020); William C. Spaulding, “The Creation of I's,” Williamspaulding.com, 1982, 
https://williamspaulding.com/philosophy/i.htm (Accessed February 27, 2020). 
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• A merged passage: For at least two conscious bodies, <x1 … xn>, <x1 … xn>’s streams of 
consciousness continue, following <x1 … xn>’s deaths, as the stream of consciousness of 
some other body, y, namely the first body to have gained consciousness following <x1 … 
xn>’s deaths. 
• A split passage: For a given conscious body, x1, x1’s stream of consciousness continues, 
following x1’s death, as the streams of consciousness of at least two other bodies, <y1 … 
yn>, namely the first bodies to have gained consciousness following x1’s death, where 
those bodies have gained consciousness at the exact same moment in time. Stewart 
believes that split passages are probably unlikely since “developmental timings cannot 
approach the perfect synchronization posited in the split passage.”9 
• An ex nihilo passage: y’s stream of consciousness is not the continuation of any 
antecedent stream of consciousness. An ex nihilo passage occurs if and only if y achieves 
consciousness, but neither a unitary passage, nor a merged passage nor a split passage has 
occurred.10 
In Chapter 11, Stewart also discusses alternatives to his existential passage hypothesis. 
He calls these alternatives the permeable identity hypotheses.11 He argues that they are 
conceivable, though unlikely to be true. Stewart identifies two: (I have restated these hypotheses 
and given them unique names.) 
• The strongly permeable identity hypothesis: For any conscious body, x, x’s stream of 
consciousness continues, following x’s death, as the stream of consciousness of at least 
one other body, y, namely any body that is conscious following x’s death. 
• The weakly permeable identity hypothesis: For any conscious body, x, x’s stream of 
consciousness continues, following x’s death, as the stream of consciousness of some 
other body, y, namely the first body to have gained or regained consciousness following 
x’s death. 
Importantly, by regained consciousness, what I mean (from this point onward) is that y (the 
body) was previously conscious, then y lost consciousness and, after an unspecified amount of 
time, y returned to consciousness. According to MedlinePlus, 
“Unconsciousness is when a person is unable to respond to people and activities. Doctors often 
call this a coma or being in a comatose state. […] Being asleep is not the same as being 
unconscious. A sleeping person will respond to loud noises or gentle shaking. An unconscious 
person will not.”12 
 
 
9 http://mbdefault.org/11_types/default.asp (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
10 http://mbdefault.org/11_types/11_6.htm (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
11 http://mbdefault.org/11_types/default.asp#fn7 (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
12 Unconsciousness – first aid. MedlinePlus. U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM). 
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/000022.htm (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
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2. Assessment of the Arguments 
 
In Chapter 9, Stewart argues I think successfully for the core intuition of his existential passage 
hypothesis, i.e., the intuition that the passage between x’s death and y’s birth is “understood as 
unfelt time-gap, with nothing superadded—rather, and critically, with individuation subtracted. 
All that has ‘passed’ is a shift of perceived existential ‘moment’—a natural relocation of the 
awareness of existence.”13 Philosopher Thomas W. Clark calls this generic subjective 
continuity.14 In arguing for this core intuition, Stewart refers to two plausible, central concepts: 
time-gaps and the stream of thought. (I refer to the latter concept as the stream of consciousness.) 
Both concepts are credited to William James.15 Stewart’s achievement is especially remarkable 
on account of how revolutionary the core intuition is. 
In Chapter 11, Stewart does a really great job of explaining and illustrating the various 
types of existential passage and showing how they jointly exhaust the possibilities. This is 
crucial work for the development of a complete theory of generic subjective continuity. 
In a lengthy footnote (that would have merited discussion in a separate section), Stewart 
objects to both permeable identity hypotheses on the grounds that “the stream of thought persists 
unbroken throughout life” and that “we ourselves perceive subjective experience as a deeply 
unified whole”.16 But these arguments are undercut by Stewart’s later acknowledgment that “the 
passage recipient would be ignorant of any such [passage] events, just as he or she would have 
been ignorant of the existential passage which transpired at conscious birth.”17 
In the same footnote, Stewart also objects to both permeable identity hypotheses on the 
grounds that they are not supported by any strong arguments or intuitions, and because 
“subjectivity is conserved in the thalamocortical system, even during sleep,” whereby that 
system sets a “baseline integrity of subjective experience.” The latter objection is addressed 
below in my counterargument to objection “(2) Potentiality”. 
With regard to the former objection, let us assume for the sake of argument that Stewart 
is correct in claiming that no supporting arguments or intuitions are forthcoming. And let us 
define permeable identities as identities (or bodies) that are capable of receiving existential 
passages during the course of their lives, even after having initially achieved consciousness. 
Whether permeable identities do or do not exist we should not expect to have strong supporting 
arguments or intuitions about whether they exist, either way. Again, I need only point to 
Stewart’s own acknowledgement that if permeable identities did exist, then these identities 
 
13 http://mbdefault.org/9_passage/2.asp (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
14 Thomas W. Clark, “Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity,” The Humanist 54, no. 6 (November 1994): 15–21. 
http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/death/death-nothingness-and-subjectivity (Accessed July 6, 2018); Thomas 
W. Clark, “A Notable Theoretical Convergence,” Naturalism.Org, http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/death/a-
notable-theoretical-convergence (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
15 William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1 (New York: Holt, 1890), 
https://archive.org/details/theprinciplesofp01jameuoft. 
16 http://mbdefault.org/11_types/default.asp#fn7 (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
17 http://mbdefault.org/11_types/default.asp#fn7 (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
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would be completely oblivious to any passage events. Therefore, a lack of strong supporting 
arguments or intuitions about permeable identities cannot be counterevidence of permeable 
identities. 
Actually, though, I believe that we do have strong supporting arguments and intuitions 
about permeable identities, more specifically, weakly permeable identities—i.e., permeable 
identities that are capable of receiving existential passages only when they gain or regain 
consciousness. We can begin by noting that, all else being equal, hypotheses that posit weakly 
permeable identities are more parsimonious, and as such, more plausible than hypotheses that 
posit strongly permeable identities—i.e., permeable identities that are capable of receiving 
existential passages at any and every moment.18 
On this basis, strong arguments (or counterarguments) will be made (in what follows) in 
support of an extended hypothesis that posits weakly permeable identities. From now onward, I 
will refer to that hypothesis simply as the extended existential passage hypothesis. I define it as 
follows: 
For any conscious body, x, x’s stream of consciousness continues, following any 
(permanent or temporary) loss of consciousness by x, as the stream of consciousness of at 
least one body (or passage recipient), y, namely the first body to have gained or regained 
consciousness following x’s loss of consciousness, where instances of x can be instances 
of y (i.e., the passage recipient can be x itself). 
The notion of extended existential passage is defined as follows: 
For any conscious body, x, the passage that occurs when x’s stream of consciousness 
continues, following any (permanent or temporary) loss of consciousness by x, as the 
stream of consciousness of at least one body (or passage recipient), y, namely the first 
body to have gained or regained consciousness following x’s loss of consciousness, 
where instances of x can be instances of y (i.e., the passage recipient can be x itself).19 
Using Chapter 11’s four passage types as a template, we can identify four types of extended 
existential passage: 
• A unitary passage: For a given conscious body, x1, x1’s stream of consciousness 
continues, following any loss of consciousness by x1, as the stream of consciousness of 
some body, y, namely the first body to have gained or regained consciousness following 
x1’s loss of consciousness (where x1 can be y); and neither a merged passage nor a split 
passage has occurred. 
• A merged passage: For at least two conscious bodies, <x1 … xn>, <x1 … xn>’s streams of 
consciousness continue, following any losses of consciousness by <x1 … xn>, as the 
stream of consciousness of some body, y, namely the first body to have gained or 
 
18 Alan Baker, “Simplicity.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/simplicity/. 
19 Contrary to existential passage, extended existential passage can thus occur between living bodies. 
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regained consciousness following <x1 … xn>’s losses of consciousness (where <x1 or … 
xn> can be y). 
• A split passage: For a given conscious body, x1, x1’s stream of consciousness continues, 
following any loss of consciousness by x1, as the streams of consciousness of at least two 
bodies, <y1 … yn>, namely the first bodies to have gained or regained consciousness 
following x1’s loss of consciousness, where those bodies have (respectively) gained and 
regained consciousness at the exact same moment in time (where x1 can be <y1 or … 
yn>). 
• An ex nihilo passage: y’s stream of consciousness is not the continuation of any 
antecedent stream of consciousness. An ex nihilo passage occurs if and only if y gains or 
regains consciousness, but neither a unitary passage, nor a merged passage nor a split 
passage has occurred. 
Stewart does not explicitly acknowledge this extended existential passage hypothesis. 
Other than his arguments against strongly permeable identities and weakly permeable identities 
(which I have addressed above), Stewart’s implicit rejection of this extended existential passage 
hypothesis in favor of his more restricted existential passage hypothesis appears to be based on 
Arguments (1) and (2) as they are restated below. Here is a telling passage from Chapter 9: 
Subjectively, Nicos’ unfelt time-gap continues, indefinitely. […] 
This particular time-gap is unusual in that it is open-ended. Nicos’ inanimate body cannot 
restore subjectivity to Nicos in future; as a result, it cannot end the time-gap which Nicos’ death 
has initiated. 
Hereafter I will refer to this special type of unfelt time-gap as a ‘mortal amnesia’: it is the 
forgetfulness of existence we can associate with failure of the criteria of personal identity. By prior 
reasoning this amnesia is irreversible. Having encountered mortal amnesia, Nicos afterwards lacks 
the means of perceiving any aspect of his condition, or of recovering in future any of the memories 
which death has destroyed.20 
Arguments (1) and (2) and my counterarguments to each are as follows: 
(1) Backward causation: The future restoration of x’s personal identity (or alternatively, the 
future restoration of key attributes guarantying the continuity of x’s personal identity), 
upon or after x’s return to consciousness, prevents x’s extended existential passage (to 
another passage recipient) from occurring in the present. 
Note: In Chapter 8, Stewart argues at length that x’s personal identity is best understood as a 
combination of three key attributes: physical continuity, episodic memory and subjectivity.21 
My reply to (1): Backward causation is only possible if we accept a tenseless theory of 
time (or B-theory of time)—where the past, present and future are equally real. But the notion of 
a stream of consciousness (as it is used in Chapters 9 and 11) seems to necessitate a tensed 
theory of time (or A-theory of time)—where the present is real, but not the future. This is because 
 
20 http://mbdefault.org/9_passage/default.asp (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
21 http://mbdefault.org/8_identity/default.asp (Accessed July 6, 2018). 
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the tensed (or A-) theory of time is seemingly the only theory of time that allows for the 
objective passage of time (or objective becoming) that is needed to make sense of the notion of a 
stream of consciousness. Without objective temporal passage (or objective passage of time), 
conscious experience is nothing more than a set of counterfactually-related conscious 
experiences superimposed on a set of time coordinates. Consequently, without objective 
temporal passage, there can be no stream of consciousness and so, no generic subjective 
continuity—i.e., no existential passage and no extended existential passage. According to The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
A proper notion of backward causation requires a static account of time in the sense that there is 
no objective becoming, no coming into being such that future events exist on the par with present 
and past events. It means that the future is real, the future does not merely consist of unrealised 
possibilities or even nothing at all. […] If backward causation is to be conceptually possible it 
forces us to be realists with respect to the future. The future must contain facts, events with certain 
properties, and these facts can make sentences about the future true or false. Such a realist account 
is provided by static and tenseless theories of time.22 
Some recent metaphysical work has however challenged the widely accepted view that, 
under a tenseless (or B-) theory of time, time does not objectively pass: 
Most B-theorists defend the reality of both time and change. Overwhelmingly, however, they deny 
that time genuinely passes, insisting that the passage of time is some kind of cognitive illusion. In 
this chapter it is argued that, while A-theoretic accounts of the passage of time are indeed 
mistaken, there is no reason for the B-theorist to resist the idea of mind-independent temporal 
passage. This mistake stems from two sources: first, the implicit acceptance of the A-theory’s 
understanding of passage; secondly, from the unnecessary assumption that temporal passage is 
best understood as some kind of motion. A tenseless, relational account of passage that is based on 
tenseless, temporal relations is presented and defended. It is further argued that the B-theory is 
compatible with an objective direction of time.23 
If this new perspective is correct, then the idea of a stream of consciousness appears to be fully 
consistent with a tenseless (or B-) theory of time. So, let us suppose for the sake of argument that 
the idea of a stream of consciousness is entirely consistent with a tenseless (or B-) theory of time. 
Is (1) then salvageable? 
I do not believe so. The reason I say this is that Argument (1) presupposes Argument (2) 
(see below), and Argument (2) is unsustainable. Let me explain: (1) states that personal identity 
or key attributes thereof have the power to retro-cause x’s prior stream of consciousness to 
continue in x. But as I will explain in my reply to (2), we have no reason to think that personal 
 
22 Jan Faye, “Backward Causation.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/causation-backwards/. See also Ned Markosian, 
“Time,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/time/. 
23 Joshua Mozersky, “The B-theory and the passage of time,” Time, Language, and Ontology: The World from the 




identity or key attributes thereof have any such potentiality—i.e., whether we take the cause to 
precede its effect (forward causality) or the effect to precede its cause (backward causality). 
(2) Potentiality: When x has all the markers of temporary unconsciousness, x has the 
potential to receive x’s continued stream of consciousness, and so, upon x’s return to 
consciousness, x’s prior stream of consciousness seamlessly continues as x’s renewed 
stream of consciousness. 
My reply to (2): As long as x’s neural and cognitive machinery remains intact, x has the 
potential to experience a stream of consciousness imbued with x’s memories and personality 
traits. That, we can all agree on. However, we have no justifiable reason for claiming that upon 
x’s return to consciousness, x’s stream of consciousness must have this or that origination on the 
basis of x’s neural and cognitive machinery. 
Since streams of consciousness unimbued with the bodies’ memories and personality 
traits differ only in their originations and since x’s neural and cognitive machinery cannot 
discriminate among originations, unimbued streams of consciousness are indistinguishable to x’s 
neural and cognitive machinery. Therefore, as long as x’s neural and cognitive machinery 
remains intact, then upon x’s return to consciousness, x has the potential to receive any unimbued 
stream of consciousness—i.e., either ex nihilo or from any conscious body—within the passage 
rules entailed by generic subjective continuity. 
It is also worth noting that personal identity abstracted from x’s neural and cognitive 
machinery has no potentiality as it is abstracta—abstract objects (e.g. numbers, sets, 
propositions, etc.) are considered causally inert.24 
For all these reasons, I believe that (2) is unsustainable. And if we apply the same line of 
reasoning to y, then we also have strong reasons for positing a weakly permeable identity—i.e., 
where y is the first body to have gained or regained consciousness following x’s loss of 
consciousness. 
To sum up, I have argued that as long as generic subjective continuity is itself plausible, 
then among the various alternative hypotheses that posit generic subjective continuity (e.g. the 
weakly permeable identity hypothesis, the strongly permeable identity hypothesis, the (restricted) 
existential passage hypothesis, etc.), the extended existential passage hypothesis is the only one 
of those hypotheses that can be considered plausible. As such, since Stewart argues successfully 
for generic subjective continuity, we have every reason to give credence not to the restricted 
existential passage hypothesis but rather to the extended existential passage hypothesis (as 
defined and explicated above). 
 
 
24 Gideon Rosen, “Abstract Objects,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/abstract-objects/#CausInefCrit. 
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3. Further Comments and Suggestions 
 
In some multiverse theories (i.e., physical theories positing multiple universes), such as the 
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, causal interactions between different 
universes are a theoretical possibility.25 Such multiverse theories thus certainly do not rule out 
extended existential passage between different universes. 
In Chapter 18, Stewart explains in what ways his passage hypothesis could profitably 
inform environmental decision theory and ethics. To give one example, Stewart points out that if 
we accept his passage hypothesis, then we are rationally required to do what we can for the 
welfare of posterity—i.e., future generations of conscious creatures—because we ourselves will 
join posterity via existential passage.26 
Building on Chapters 9 and 11, one worthwhile project would be to research how likely it 
is for someone’s unimbued stream of consciousness to pass—via extended existential passage—
to a comparatively worse stream of consciousness. One would need to calculate the odds of 
various experiential outcomes of extended existential passage—e.g. the passage recipient lives a 
pleasant life, the passage recipient is plunged into misery, etc.—under various assumptions—i.e., 
one or multiple spaciotemporal universe(s) (i.e. multiverse theory). With this knowledge, every 
person would be able to determine, in light of their individual circumstances and on the basis of 
rational choice theory,27 whether it would be rational for them to endeavor to prolong their 
conscious life indefinitely in order to avoid risky extended existential passages. For example, this 
research could count as a pragmatic reason to make investments in life-extension medical 
research. 
“Recent biotechnological progress indicates that many aspects of aging may indeed be effectively 
treatable by regenerative medicine in the foreseeable future. We cannot yet know whether all aspects 
will be, but extensive scrutiny has failed to identify any definite exceptions. Therefore, at this point 
there is a significant chance that such therapies would postpone age-related decline by several years, if 
 
25 Rainer Plaga, “On a possibility to find experimental evidence for the many-worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics,” Foundations of Physics 27, no. 4 (1997): 559–77, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02550677 
(https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9510007.pdf). 
26 “For [Peter] Singer, the critical anatomic structure is just the central nervous system (CNS) itself. The CNS makes 
possible the sensation of pleasure and pain. Consequently the CNS makes a creature deserving of natural rights and 
ethical treatment. Singer’s ethical conclusion dovetails with the metaphysical conclusion of Chapter 17. In that 
chapter we found that Metaphysics by Default would seem to apply not to Homo sapiens alone, but to CNS species 
generally. CNS species have been shown to meet the criteria of personal identity: it follows that creatures of all CNS 
species may be thought to participate in the web of existential passages described by Metaphysics by Default.” 
(http://mbdefault.org/18_benefits/default.asp. Accessed July 6, 2018.) 
27 R. A. Briggs, “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 




not more, which constitutes a clear case for allocating significant resources to the attempt to develop 
those therapies.”28 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
On the basis of my review of Chapters 9 and 11, I can confidently say that these chapters are a 
must-read for any person interested in their own existential fate and in that of human-kind and 
conscious-kind more generally. These chapters deserve to be widely cited in the philosophical 
literature, especially on metaphysics, ethics and decision theory, where Stewart’s existential 
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